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TryHackMe: Boogeyman-2 Challenge

TryHackMe: Boogeyman-2 Challenge

Introduction

Challenge Link: Boogeyman 2

After having a severe attack from the Boogeyman, Quick Logistics LLC improved its security defences. However, the Boogeyman returns with new and improved tactics, techniques and procedures

Artefacts

For the investigation, you will be provided with the following artefacts:

  • Copy of the phishing email.
  • Memory dump of the victim’s workstation.

Tools:

  • Volatility - an open-source framework for extracting digital artefacts from volatile memory (RAM) samples.
  • Olevba - a tool for analysing and extracting VBA macros from Microsoft Office documents. This tool is also a part of the Oletools suite.

Spear Phishing Human Resources

The Boogeyman is back!

analyse and assess the impact of the compromise.

Analysis:

  • cat the content of the email and save it in a txt file.
  • I used Message Header Analyzer to paste the content of the email.
  • the email sent from westaylor23@outlook.com to maxine.beck@quicklogisticsorg.onmicrosoft.com
  • the attachment is named: Resume_WesleyTaylor.doc.

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Copy the base64-encoding from the email content and rebuild the document file.

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Use this tool olevba to analyse and extract Visual Basic macro from the .doc file

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in VirousTotal, the code already have been analyzed. The macro downloaded a payload from the remote server, and saved it as a JavaScript file js in this path (C:\ProgramData\update.js), then used the process wscript.exe to execute update.js -> (wscript.exe C:\ProgramData\update.js). Now let’s analyze the RAM. Use vol <.raw> windows.pstree to return the processes and their parent process.

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At 2023-08-21 14:12:31, the .doc file opened, which spawned the process wscript.exe. After the execution of the wscript.exe, it created a process to be used for C2 connection, updater.exe. I used this plugin windows.cmdline to view the command-line used to launch a process.

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Use this plugin windows.netscan to view the IP address and port used for the C2 connection established by updater.exe process

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the ip address used for C2 connection is 128.199.95.189 on port 8080. To see if there is any persistence on the machine. Use windows.memmap.Memmap plugin to view memory mapping information for updater.exe process

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vol -f WKSTN-2961.raw -o updater_dump/  windows.memmap.Memmap --pid 6216 --dump

Use strings command to look for ASCII strings, with option -el which allows you to extract Unicode-encoded strings. On Windows systems, many strings (like file paths, commands,registry keys) are stored in UTF-16LE format, where each character is stored as 2 bytes (little-endian).

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strings -el updater_dump/pid.6216.dmp | grep -iC 4 "powershell.exe"

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This command creates a scheduled task named “Updater” that runs daily at 9:00 AM. The task executes a hidden PowerShell command that:

  • Reads a value called debug from the Windows registry
  • Decodes that value from Base64 (encoded as Unicode)
  • Executes the decoded code using Invoke-Expression (IEX)
This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.